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REGARDLESS OF MY STATUS, I AM A HUMAN BEING:
IMMIGRANT DETAINEES AND RECOURSE TO THE ALIEN TORT
STATUTE
Anshu Budhrani
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INTRODUCTION
Boubacar Bah, a fifty-two-year-old tailor from Guinea with a wife
and young children, died in June 2007 in the custody of immigration
officials after undergoing emergency surgery for a skull fracture and
multiple brain hemorrhages that had left him comatose. When information finally surfaced regarding his treatment in a New Jersey detention facility run by the Corrections Corporation of America, details emerged about how he had been “shackled and pinned to the
floor of the medical unit as he moaned and vomited [and] then left
in a disciplinary cell for more than thirteen hours, despite repeated
notations that he was unresponsive and intermittently foaming at the
1
mouth.” A confidential video showed him handcuffed, face down in
the medical unit crying out in his native Fulani, “Help, they are kill2
ing me!”
Mr. Bah’s story is just one of the many tragic stories reported on
3
by Nina Bernstein, a writer for the New York Times who published a
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Nina Bernstein, Few Details on Immigrants Who Died in U.S. Custody, N.Y. TIMES, May 5,
2008, at A1.
Nina Bernstein, Officials Obscured Truth of Migrant Deaths in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2010,
at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Nina Bernstein received the 2009 Hillman Prize for Newspaper Journalism for her work
exposing immigrant deaths in detention. 2011 Hillman Prize for Newspaper Journalism,
SIDNEY HILLMAN FOUND., http://www.hillmanfoundation.org/hillman-prizes/hillmanprize-newspaper-journalism (last visited Dec. 2, 2011). In her acceptance speech at the
awards ceremony, she referred to the immigration detention system as a “secretive billion
dollar system; a patchwork of profit-making prisons, county lock-ups, and federal jails virtually devoid of the due process safeguards that people who watch ‘Law & Order’ take for
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series of scathing exposés of conditions at government and privately
run immigration detention centers. Each story is unbelievably more
horrific than the next: A twenty-two-year-old detainee at the Bergen
County Jail in New Jersey committed suicide because of “unbearable,
4
untreated pain.” A thirty-four-year-old computer engineer and father of two died from undiagnosed and untreated cancer that ulti5
mately metastasized to cover his entire body. A mentally ill man with
a history of schizophrenia died on August 22, 2004, after hanging
himself with a bed sheet. While detainees must be checked on every
thirty minutes, this man had been dead “for at least four to six hours
6
before his body was found.” A German-born forty-eight-year-old
man, who had spent forty-two years in the United States, died in November 2008 in immigration detention from endocarditis, an infec7
tion of the heart valve that is easily cured by antibiotics. Immigration
officials allowed his treatable infection to rage out of control: “the
bacteria colonizing his heart broke loose, creating abscesses in his
8
brain, liver and kidneys.” His incredible pain, which caused him to
sob through the night, went unacknowledged by immigration deten9
tion officials. Had they afforded him the medical attention he deserved, he would most probably still be alive.
All of the above stories share a common thread: a complete lack
of humanity towards immigrant detainees and desperate attempts to
10
cover up abuses and deaths. The United States government has in-
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granted.” HillmanFoundation, 2009 Hillman Prize for Newspaper Journalism Awards Ceremony—Nina Bernstein, at 2:37, YOUTUBE (June 10, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=VQ0wdyCZ00U.
Bernstein, supra note 2, at A1.
Nina Bernstein, Ill and in Pain, Detainee Dies in U.S. Hands, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2008, at
A1.
AMNESTY INT’L, JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE: IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE USA 41
(2009), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/uploads/JailedWithoutJustice.pdf (internal quotation marks omitted).
Nina Bernstein, Another Jail Death, and Mounting Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2009, at
A14.
Id.
Id.
According to Nina Bernstein’s review of deaths in immigration detention centers, “[n]o
government body is required to keep track of deaths and publicly report them. No independent inquiry is mandated.” Bernstein, supra note 1, at A18. Critics and many members of Congress have openly stated that this process “leaves too much to the agency’s
discretion, allowing some deaths to be swept under the rug while potential witnesses are
transferred or deported.” Id. A more recent review of the conditions within immigration
detention facilities reveals that not much has improved. See ACLU OF ARIZ, IN THEIR OWN
WORDS: ENDING ABUSE IN ARIZONA IMMIGRATION DETENTION CENTERS 3 (2011), available
at
http://acluaz.org/sites/default/files/documents/detention%20report%202011.pdf
(providing a report on the inhumane treatment of immigrant detainees in Arizona).
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creased its use of civil detention for noncitizens and with that increase has come a corresponding decrease in adherence to detention
standards. Common complaints include “inadequate health care,
physical and sexual abuse, overcrowding, discrimination, and rac12
ism.” Additionally, while the Obama Administration has announced
an overhaul of the immigration detention system, it has concurrently
refused to create legally binding rules, arguing that “‘rule-making
would be laborious, time-consuming and less flexible’” than a simple
13
overhaul.
Another contributing factor to deteriorating conditions of confinement has to do with economics: the business of immigration detention is booming. As the federal government continues to target,
detain, and deport noncitizens, the demand for more immigration
14
detention beds has increased exponentially. The GEO Group, an
international private prison operator that controls about a quarter of
the United States private prison industry, is adding thousands of beds
to its detention centers nationwide, while Corrections Corporation of
America, which manages more than 50% of all prison beds under
private contract in America, saw its revenue from its federal custom15
ers increase by almost 5%. These corporations are cramming as
many beds as they can into their facilities to fulfill increased demand.
As these corporations thrive and prosper, the detained noncitizens they house suffer. On any given day, more than 32,000 people
are held in detention while the government decides whether to deport them, with the annual total reaching an astounding 407,000
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15

This Comment will endeavor to use the term “noncitizen” instead of “alien” when referring to non-nationals because of the dehumanizing qualities associated with the term
“alien.” That term will only be used when necessary, as when in direct quotations.
SUNITA PATEL & TOM JAWETZ, ACLU, CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT IN IMMIGRATION
DETENTION FACILITIES 1 (2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/prison/unsr
_briefing_materials.pdf.
Nina Bernstein, Documents Reveal Earlier Immigrant Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/nyregion/10detainside.html?ref=incustodydeath
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Interestingly, the private prison industry itself has helped to facilitate an increase in demand for prison beds. According to a report by National Public Radio, members of this
industry waged a “quiet, behind-the-scenes effort to help draft and pass Arizona Senate
Bill 1070,” which would require police to detain anyone they stopped who could not show
proof of a legal entry into this country. See Laura Sullivan, Prison Economics Help Drive Ariz.
Immigration Law, NPR (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyId=130833741.
Renee Feltz, Focus on “Criminal Aliens” Increases Demand for Immigration Detention Business,
HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 5, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/renee-feltz/focus-oncriminal-aliens_b_347303.html.
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16

people. The current immigration practices are supported by President Obama, who signed the Department of Homeland Security’s
2010 budget into law. The budget included $2.5 billion for detention
and removal operations and another $200 million for the Secure
Communities program, which screens for undocumented immigrants
by taking the fingerprints of anyone booked into local jail and matching them with fingerprints in an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) database in an effort to maximize immigrant detention
17
and removal.
These individuals, regardless of their immigration status, are human beings deserving of the same dignity and respect afforded to citizens of the United States. Immigration detention, now a thriving
business in the United States, allows private contractors to make
money off of treating noncitizens worse than caged animals, which
does not fit well with the world’s notion of the United States as a beacon of morality.
This Comment will argue that while detained noncitizens do have
some constitutional rights that allow them to protest their arbitrary
detention, including the duration of their confinement, those rights
do not fully extend to protecting them from the cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment they are subject to while in custody. Additionally, even though rights to lodge due process arguments exist under
the Constitution, it is incredibly difficult to obtain relief, and the cases generally require much litigation, which is especially expensive
since immigrant detainees do not have a right to counsel.
Thus, this Comment proposes that noncitizen detainees lodge
Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) claims based on the customary international norm prohibiting cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.
After discussing a brief history of the constitutional protections now
afforded to detained noncitizens and the incredible difficulty of basing a compensation claim on constitutional violations, this Comment
will then discuss the development of ATS litigation, its increased re-

16

17

See In-Custody Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2011, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference
/timestopics/subjects/i/immigration_detention_us/incustody_deaths/index.html (stating that over 407,000 noncitizens were held in detention in the United States in 2008).
See Feltz, supra note 15 (describing the screening efforts of the Secure Communities Program). See also Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, FY2011: ICE
Announces Year-End Removal Numbers, Highlights Focus on Clear Priorities Including
Threats to Public Safety and National Security (Oct. 18, 2011), available at
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1110/111018washingtondc.htm, for information on
the government’s most recent data on removals during fiscal year 2011. ICE touted its
removal of 396,906 immigrants as a great policy achievement, one that follows the United
States’ policy to detect, detain, and remove those without status from this country. Id.
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levance to cases of abuse in immigration detention, and some potential issues that detainees will need to address to lodge successful
claims.
I. WHAT DOES THE CONSTITUTION SAY?
The Constitution does not completely abandon noncitizens.
Many detained noncitizens have successfully brought due process
claims under the Fifth Amendment challenging the duration of their
confinement. These cases, along with the recent spur of Guantanamo cases, have helped to delineate the boundaries of appropriate
behavior regarding the confinement of noncitizens, whether within
the United States or abroad. Additionally, the Court has allowed
plaintiffs to recover damages for constitutional violations committed
by federal agents in certain, highly limited circumstances. However,
this Comment will show that these constitutional remedies have proven to be ineffective and nearly impossible to achieve when lodging a
claim protesting conditions of confinement in immigration detention
centers.
A. Brief History
The movement towards greater constitutional protections for
18
noncitizens essentially started with Yick Wo v. Hopkins, where the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens. . . . [Its] provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of
19
color, or of nationality . . . .” Around ten years later, when address20
ing the Fifth Amendment in Wong Wing v. United States, the Court
concluded that “all persons within the territory of the United States
are entitled to the protection guaranteed by [the Fifth and Sixth]
[A]mendments, and that even aliens shall not be held to answer for a
capital or other infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indict21
ment of a grand jury.” The Court then extended its sentiments al22
most a century later in Mathews v. Diaz when it proclaimed:
18
19
20
21
22

118 U.S. 356 (1886).
Id. at 369.
163 U.S. 228 (1896).
Id. at 238.
426 U.S. 67 (1976) (confirming the Constitution’s recognition of aliens even while rejecting the due process claim challenging a five-year residency requirement for noncitizens
seeking federal medical benefits).
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There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United
States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment,
protects every one of these persons from deprivation of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. Even one whose presence in this
country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitu23
tional protection.

The Fifth Amendment itself proclaims that “[n]o person shall
be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
24
law” and has been heavily employed by noncitizens detained in immigration detention centers for long periods of time. Thus, from this
provision has sprouted a veritable fountain of case law dealing with
the procedural and substantive protections due noncitizens, including those who are not officially considered as having entered the
United States.
B. What Exactly Is “Civil Confinement”?
Before considering the case law, it is first important to understand
the nature of civil confinement in the United States. The Supreme
Court has enunciated some basic principles applicable to the civil
confinement of noncitizens. In a recent decision, the Court stated
that “‘government detention violates th[e Due Process] Clause’ unless it is imposed as punishment in a criminal proceeding conforming
to the rigorous procedures constitutionally required for such proceedings, or ‘in certain special and narrow non-punitive circums25
tances.’” The Court then went on to explain what it meant by “special” and “non-punitive” detention and stated that such detention is
“permissible only where an individual (1) is either in criminal or immigration proceedings and has been shown to be a danger to the
26
community or [a] flight risk; (2) is dangerous because of a ‘harmthreatening mental illness’ that impairs his ability to control his dan27
28
gerousness; or (3) is an enemy alien during a declared war.” Thus,
“civil detention must be measured and tempered by individualized

23
24
25

26
27
28

Id. at 77 (citations omitted).
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J.
1003, 1010 (2002) (alterations in original) (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690
(2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688; United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752–53
(1987); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 541–42 (1952)).
Id. (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412–13 (2002); Kansas
v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357 (1997)).
Id. (citing Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 171–73 (1948)).
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decision making and by finding that the individual presents a ‘danger
29
to the community’ or a ‘flight risk.’”
Immigration detention is thus meant to serve a very limited func30
tion, one distinct from the penal nature of criminal incarceration.
Its purpose is to “hold, process, and prepare individuals for remov31
al,” with its most severe form, mandatory detention with no possibility of an individualized bond determination, only passing constitutional muster because it is “premised on the idea that immigration
32
detention is so limited in scope, purpose, and duration.” These
conceptions of immigration detention also comport with international law, which requires that “detention pending removal must be justified as a necessary and proportionate measure in each individual case
and should only be used as a measure of last resort and be subject to
33
judicial review.”
The reality of immigration detention though is neither limited in
purpose nor scope. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
(“INA”), in Section 1226 for example, creates a presumption of detention for people apprehended by the federal government at the
border who lack documents for admission, regardless of whether or
34
not they pose a flight risk. This includes the mandatory detention
of “asylum seekers, torture survivors, victims of human trafficking,
longtime lawful permanent residents, and the parents of U.S. citizen
35
children.”
After apprehension then, access to some sort of judicial review
depends on whether the individual was apprehended at the border,
apprehended within the United States, or convicted of certain crimes
36
while in the United States. For those captured at the border, decisions regarding detention are made by immigration officers as these

29
30

31

32
33
34

35
36

Lenni B. Benson, As Old as the Hills: Detention and Immigration, 5 INTERCULTURAL HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 11, 14 (2010).
N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CLINIC, LOCKED UP BUT NOT FORGOTTEN 3
(2010)
[hereinafter
Locked
Up
But
Not
Forgotten],
available
at
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/20100429_detentionreport_Apri
l2010.pdf.
DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp
/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf.
LOCKED UP BUT NOT FORGOTTEN, supra note 30, at 3.
AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 6, at 6.
See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2006) (“[A]n alien may
be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from
the United States.”).
AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 6, at 3.
Id. at 6.
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individuals are not entitled to judicial review of their detention.
The situation for those apprehended inside the United States is functionally equivalent to those captured at the border because even
though these individuals are entitled to review by an immigration
judge, this review oftentimes does not take place or is greatly de38
layed. Finally, those individuals who have resided in the United
States for many years and are oftentimes legal permanent residents
are subject to mandatory detention if convicted of committing a specified type of crime. They are not afforded a hearing to determine
their status and are automatically detained while awaiting deportation. The process itself is flawed in that with increasing frequency,
U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents have spent months or
years in detention before being able to prove that they are not de39
portable.
C. Constitutional Case Law
40

It is from this expansive use of civil confinement that a series of
Supreme Court cases emerged challenging the authority of the federal government both to detain noncitizens for extended periods of
time and to hold them in conditions that did not conform with estab41
lished standards. Zadvydas v. Davis is the first in a series of major
cases highlighting the Court’s desire to exert some sort of restraint
on the broad authority brandished by immigration authorities. Kestutis Zadvydas immigrated to the United States from a displaced per42
sons camp in Germany at the age of eight. As a resident noncitizen,
he accrued a lengthy criminal record that culminated in a cocaine
distribution conviction that rendered him deportable after he fi37
38
39
40

41
42

Id.
Id.
Id. at 7.
John Morton, the Assistant Secretary of ICE, in a statement before the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Appropriations regarding proposed budget increases for
the fiscal year 2012, boasted of a 40% increase in the average daily detention population
at ICE facilities and the overall arrest of 55,212 individuals in 2011 as support for the
work ICE does and its continued need for funds. See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement FY 2012 Budget Request Before the Subcomm. on Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of John Morton, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/speeches/
031111morton.pdf. Nina Bernstein’s article on immigration detention further confirms
the expansive use of civil confinement. She states that the immigration detention system
“continues to detain some 400,000 people a year.” Nina Bernstein, Sick Detained Immigrant
to Appeal to U.N. for Help, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2010, at A27.
533 U.S. 678 (2001).
Id. at 684.
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43

nished serving his criminal sentence. However, given the circumstances of his birth, Mr. Zadvydas did not possess citizenship in any
other country and consequently, the United States was unable to
44
identify any country willing to accept him. While Section 241 of the
INA provides that a removal order must be effectuated within ninety
days, it also provides that the Attorney General can determine that
45
certain noncitizens “may be detained beyond the removal period.”
Thus, the government argued that this provision permitted them to
detain Mr. Zadvydas indefinitely while they continued to identify a
46
country willing to accept him, which in turn prompted Mr. Zadvydas
to file a writ of habeas corpus challenging his detention on Fifth
47
Amendment grounds.
The Court held that “a statute permitting indefinite detention of
an alien would raise a serious constitutional problem” and that
“[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the li48
berty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” But, in declining to
49
overrule Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, the Court did also
make a significant distinction between those noncitizens who had already entered the United States, like Zadvydas, and those whose extended departure required them to seek reentry into the United
States, as was the case in Mezei. According to the Court in Zadvydas,
50
being treated “as if stopped at the border” made all the difference.
However, once noncitizens officially enter the country, “the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their pres51
ence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”
In
addition to this distinction, the Court also limited the executive de-

43
44

45
46
47
48
49
50

51

Id.
Id. (“In 1994, Germany told the INS that it would not accept Zadvydas because he was not
a German citizen . . . Lithuania refused to accept Zadvydas because he was neither a Lithuanian citizen nor a permanent resident. . . . [T]he INS asked the Dominican Republic
(Zadvydas’ wife’s country) to accept him, but this effort proved unsuccessful.”).
Id. at 706 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)(Supp. V 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Id. at 689.
Id. at 686.
Id. at 690.
345 U.S. 206 (1953).
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693 (quoting Mezei, 345 U.S. at 213, 215) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990) (stating
that the Fifth Amendment’s protections do not extend to aliens outside the territorial
boundaries).
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693.
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tention power to “a period reasonably necessary to bring about that
alien’s removal from the United States,” which it held to be six
52
months “in light of the Constitution’s demands.”
After its landmark decision in Zadvydas, the Court in subsequent
53
decisions, both narrowed and expanded its holding. In Demore v.
Kim, a five-to-four majority held that a permanent resident alien, who
had conceded removability due to a conviction, could be detained
during the pendency of the removal proceedings and the administra54
tive appeal. The Court determined that mandatory detention without the possibility of bond during removal proceedings, even if the
particular individual posed no flight risk, was not an unconstitutional
deprivation of liberty. It assumed that the detention period would be
brief, relying on agency data that indicated that the vast majority of
55
immigration cases were decided in less than forty-seven days. But in
56
Clark v. Martinez, the Supreme Court broadened its holding in Zad57
vydas so that it applied to inadmissible noncitizens as well. The
Court reiterated its holding in Zadvydas, stating that the “presumptive
period during which the detention of an alien is reasonably necessary
to effectuate his removal is six months; after that, the alien is eligible
for conditional release if he can demonstrate that there is ‘no signifi58
cant likelihood of removal in the reasonably forseeable future.’” It
then extended the application of its holding to “inadmissible
59
alien[s].”
D. A New Era in Constitutional Litigation: The Guantanamo Cases
Jurisprudence regarding the rights due to noncitizens and the
conditions of their confinement has reached an apex in what some
60
are terming “The Guantanamo Era.” This term connotes a time pe-

52
53

54
55

56
57
58
59

60

Id. at 689.
See Won Kidane, The Alienage Spectrum Disorder: The Bill of Rights from Chinese Exclusion to
Guantanamo, 20 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 89, 141 (2010) (speculating that the difference in
the Supreme Court’s approach in Zadvydas as compared with Demore was the events occurring on 9/11).
538 U.S. 510 (2003).
See id. at 527–29 (stating the Executive Office for Immigration Review statistics that 85%
of all detained cases were completed within an average of forty-seven days and the median was thirty days of detention).
543 U.S. 371 (2005).
Id. at 386.
Id. at 378 (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001)).
Clark, 543 U.S. at 372.
See Kidane, supra note 53, at 140.
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riod punctuated by new legislation like the Patriot Act of 2001 and
62
the Real ID Act of 2005 which have made some revisions to existing
laws relating mainly to terrorism and have significantly expanded the
Attorney General’s authority to arrest, detain, and deport immigrants. But this time period has also been marked by a period of unexpected response by the judiciary, whose decisions have been more
closely aligned with Zadvydas in an effort to more closely protect the
rights of noncitizens against arbitrary decision-making by the executive and legislative branches. The following cases focus on unconstitutional restrictions on the writ of habeas corpus and, although the
claims that follow were lodged by individuals designated enemy combatants or detainees held in Guantanamo Bay, the case holdings are
significant since habeas review has historically played an important
role as a means for noncitizen immigrant detainees to challenge re63
moval orders.
In Rasul v. Bush, the first of many Guantanamo cases, the Court
struck down the executive’s efforts to indefinitely detain aliens in
Guantanamo Bay, holding that the Constitution prohibited such in64
definite detention of aliens without due process. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld articulated the amount of process necessary to be deemed acceptable by holding that the executive’s attempt to use a military
commission with questionable procedural safeguards was inade65
quate. Finally the Court, in the landmark decision of Boumediene v.
Bush, held that noncitizens detained by United States authorities outside of the territorial United States have a constitutional right to habeas corpus, in spite of being designated as enemy combatants by the
66
Combatant Status Review Tribunal. That holding is sure to have
widespread effects on the state of immigration detention, especially

61

62
63

64

65
66

Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (Patriot Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and
Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005).
See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305–06 (2001) (“[B]efore and after the enactment in
1875 of the first statute regulating immigration . . . [federal habeas corpus] jurisdiction
was regularly invoked on behalf of noncitizens, particularly in the immigration context.”
(citations omitted)).
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004) (“Congress extended the protections of the writ
[of habeas corpus] to ‘all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty
in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States.’” (citations
omitted)).
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006) (concluding that “the military commission convened to try Hamdan lacks power to proceed”).
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739–54 (2008).
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since the Court indicated that its analysis was not limited to habeas
review for Guantanamo detainees and should extend to other forms
67
of executive detention as well.
The Boumediene holding has also had reverberating effects on two
doctrines crucial to the understanding of immigration detention: the
plenary power doctrine and the entry fiction doctrine. The plenary
power doctrine essentially states that Congress and the executive
branch must have “unfettered authority to admit, exclude, or deport
68
aliens.” In response to the plenary power argument advanced by the
government in Boumediene, the Court stated that “[t]o hold the political branches have the power to switch the Constitution on and off at
will . . . would permit a striking anomaly in our tripartite system of
government, leading to a regime in which Congress and the Presi69
dent, not the Court, say ‘what the law is.’”
The entry fiction doctrine developed to prevent unauthorized
aliens from obtaining increased constitutional protections just by vir70
tue of their physical presence in the United States. With regard to
this doctrine then, it has been argued that the functional approach
articulated by the Court in Boumediene, that “whether a constitutional
provision has extraterritorial effect depends upon the ‘particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and the possible alternatives
71
which Congress had before it,’” should be used to provide a check
on the executive and legislative powers with respect to the treatment
of inadmissible aliens. The approach should be used as a means to
extend constitutional protections to those noncitizens physically
72
present within the United States.

67
68

69

70

71
72

Id. at 787–88.
Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the Porous Border of the Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087, 1128 (1995) (discussing
the legal challenges to U.S. detainment policies and procedures).
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803) (holding that Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 is unconstitutional on the
grounds that Congress cannot pass laws that are contrary to the Constitution, and it is the
role of the judicial system to interpret what the Constitution permits)).
Charles Ellison, Extending Due Process Protections to Unadmitted Aliens Within the U.S. Through
the Functional Approach of Boumediene, 3 CRIT. 1, 36 (2010) (discussing the potential for
affording due process rights to unadmitted aliens).
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 759 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (holding that the
Constitution supersedes all treaties ratified by the U.S. Senate)).
Ellison, supra note 70, at 45. But see Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 109
(2010) (restricting the use of the Boumediene holding for those detainees who wish to constitutionally protest the conditions of their confinement and stating that “the [Boumediene] Court expressly declined to ‘discuss the reach of the writ [of habeas corpus] with
respect to claims of unlawful conditions of treatment or confinement’ . . . which clearly
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E. Challenges to Conditions of Confinement
With the Supreme Court’s holdings in decisions like Zadvydas and
Boumediene, it is clear that detained noncitizens, both inside and outside the United States, have some constitutional protections, especially when contesting the duration of their detention. But the extension
of constitutional due process protections to those noncitizens challenging conditions of confinement is not as clear. The Supreme
Court has not really addressed this issue, and those circuit courts that
have are not in perfect alignment with one another. While there has
been some recognition of a noncitizen’s constitutional right to humane treatment, the bar to prove mistreatment has been set quite
high in some circuits.
In an important Fifth Circuit case that has been the law of that
73
74
circuit for over two decades, Lynch v. Cannatella considered whether sixteen Jamaican nationals who had entered the United States ille75
gally by stowing away aboard a barge were entitled to any protection
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Lynch
plaintiffs claimed that the officers detaining them, the New Orleans
Harbor Police, had beaten them, showered them with stun gas, deprived them of food, sprayed them with a fire hose, and left them
76
with only wet clothes and bedding materials. The Harbor Police
claimed qualified immunity, which required a showing that “their
conduct [did] not violate clearly established statutory or constitution77
al rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” They argued that since excludable aliens were not entitled to due process
protection, the plaintiffs did not have a “clearly established” constitutional right to be protected from abuse or mistreatment while in cus78
tody. The court struck down that argument.
While the court acknowledged that excludable aliens had limited
constitutional rights “with regard to immigration and deportation
proceedings,” it held that that precedent “does not limit the [constitutional] right of excludable aliens detained within the United States

73
74
75
76
77
78

strips courts of jurisdiction over claims relating to ‘any aspect of . . . treatment . . . or conditions of confinement’”) (citations omitted)).
Ellison, supra note 70, at 43.
810 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1367, 1370. Because they were never inspected and admitted, they were treated as
though they were at the border. Id.
Id. at 1367.
Taylor, supra note 68, at 1144 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
Lynch, 810 F.2d at 1372–74 (relying on Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1449 (11th
Cir. 1986) (holding that Mariel Cubans seeking parole could not claim due process protection)).
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territory to humane treatment.” The court further stated that there
are no conceivable “national interests that would justify the malicious
infliction of cruel treatment on a person in [the] United
80
States . . . simply because that person is an excludable alien.” Thus
the court concluded that “whatever due process rights excludable
aliens may be denied by virtue of their status, they are entitled under
the due process clauses of the [F]ifth and [F]ourteenth
[A]mendments to be free of gross physical abuse at the hands of state
81
or federal officials.”
Lynch seemingly proclaimed that regardless of their status under
immigration law, excludable noncitizens could claim due process
protections to challenge the conditions of their confinement. However, this proclamation was not adhered to by all circuits and some
later cases narrowed this holding by suggesting that excludable aliens
must show “malicious infliction of cruel treatment” or “gross physical
82
abuse” to state viable due process claims, essentially making it impossible for detainees to challenge the conditions of their confinement in a civil suit.
Following its holding in Lynch, the Fifth Circuit considered Medina
v. O’Neill, a case involving twenty-six Colombian noncitizens who at83
tempted to enter the United States as stowaways. Once discovered,
they were detained together for twenty-four hours a day in a single
cell designed for six people in a private facility, conditions that drove
them to mount an escape attempt that resulted in the death of one
84
and the injury of another. The stowaways then claimed that because
immigration authorities had not monitored the detention facilities
they had been placed in, their detention inflicted punishment in vi85
olation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The
Fifth Circuit, having previously differentiated between the treatment
to be afforded to deportable versus inadmissible noncitizens in detention, found that while under INA § 1252(c), the Attorney General
must provide appropriate detention facilities to deportable aliens,
there is no such statutory duty to ensure that proper facilities are also
86
provided for inadmissible aliens. Thus, despite the fact that one
stowaway was shot and another was injured, the court held that in
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

Id. at 1373.
Id. at 1374.
Id.
Taylor, supra note 68, at 1148 (internal quotation marks omitted).
838 F.2d 800, 801 (5th Cir. 1988).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 802.
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terms of their substantive due process rights, there was no evidence of
intentional cruel treatment being maliciously inflicted upon them or
87
that they suffered gross physical abuse. Their allegations against the
INS officials were found to be no more than claims of negligence, in88
sufficient to state a violation of due process rights.
The significance of the Medina holding and its import to detained
immigrants who wish to challenge the conditions of their confinement (especially in the Fifth Circuit) is that it seems to “convert the
factual allegations in Lynch into a threshold standard for all excludable alien detainees . . . . [T]he Medina court suggested ‘malicious infliction of cruel treatment’ or ‘gross physical abuse’ were prerequi89
sites for excludable aliens to state a due process violation.”
90
Two years later, in Adras v. Nelson, the Eleventh Circuit, like Medina, “extracted language from Lynch to set an unusually high threshold for excludable aliens seeking to challenge the condition of
91
their confinement.” The Haitian plaintiffs in Adras challenged the
conditions of their confinement at the Krome Detention Center in
92
southern Florida, claiming that they were subjected to “severe overcrowding, insufficient nourishment, inadequate medical treatment
and other conditions of ill-treatment arising from inadequate facili93
ties and care.” The court first noted that immigration policies regarding the rights of inadmissible noncitizens were to be determined
94
by Congress and the executive branch, not the judiciary. However,
the court could determine whether the Haitian detainees could claim
that they had suffered “gross physical abuse” or “intentional and ma-

87
88

89
90
91
92
93
94

Id. at 803.
Id.; see also Taylor, supra note 68, at 1148 (suggesting that the Medina court misapplied the
leading Supreme Court decision delineating the analysis to be used when pretrial detainees bring due process challenges to the conditions of their confinement); id. at 1147
n.308 (explaining that under Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979), pretrial detainees
are protected from any mistreatment “amount[ing] to punishment of the detainee”).
But the Medina court concluded that the Bell “punishment” standard was undermined by
later cases holding that simple negligence did not amount to a due process violation. 838
F.2d at 803. Thus the defendants in Medina succeeded in their argument that they had
never been to the facility and had no reason to believe it to be inadequate. Id.
Taylor, supra note 68, at 1148 (citations omitted).
917 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1990).
Taylor, supra note 68, at 1149.
Adras, 917 F.2d at 1553.
Id. at 1559 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1556 (citing Perez-Perez v. Hanberry, 781 F.2d 1477, 1479 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding
that the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, does not authorize the appointment and
compensation of counsel in a habeas corpus action brought by an excludable alien challenging the Attorney General’s refusal to parole him)).
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licious infliction of harm by INS agents” under the Lynch standard.
It then reasoned that while “any type of detention causes humiliation,
disgrace and injured feelings . . . . Still, the detention was lawful at all
96
times.” The court found no conflict between its ruling and that of
Lynch because “[t]here [wa]s no allegation of ‘gross physical abuse’
97
or intentional and malicious infliction of harm by INS agents.”
Thus, the legacy post-Lynch is one that places a heavy burden on
detained immigrants attempting to achieve some sort of judicial recognition of their mistreatment. While other circuits that have deliberated cases involving noncitizens challenging their conditions of confinement have not articulated as stringent a standard as the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits, their varied decisions still fall short of adequately
remedying the widespread inhumane treatment that most immigrants in detention centers experience. The Third Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, stated that immigration detainees are to receive
the same due process protections as pre-trial criminal detainees but
then explained that “the test is whether the challenged conditions
amount to punishment under the Due Process Clause” and that
“[a]bsent a showing of express intent to punish, the determination
will normally turn on whether the conditions have an alternative
purpose and whether the conditions appear excessive in relation to
98
that purpose.” Here again, the burden of proof placed on immigrant detainees is incredibly difficult to satisfy.
The Second Circuit has failed to articulate one standard when
dealing with immigrant detainee claims. In a recent district court
case, Adekoya v. Holder, the court stated that “[d]eliberate indifference
to the medical needs of an immigrant detainee in certain circumstances gives rise to a cognizable claim under the Due Process Clause
99
of the Fifth Amendment.” But, it remains unclear whether unadmitted noncitizens are entitled to the same level of protection as pretrial criminal detainees or whether they are entitled to the “gross
physical abuse” standard articulated in Lynch.
A ray of light for detained noncitizens can be found in the Ninth
Circuit, which has held that conditions of confinement for civil detainees must be superior not only to convicted prisoners, but also to
100
pre-trial criminal detainees. Conditions of confinement which are
95
96
97
98
99
100

Id. at 1559 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Dahlan v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 215 Fed. App’x 97, 100 (3d Cir. 2007).
751 F. Supp. 2d 688, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 933–34 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 820 (2005).
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found to be identical to, similar to, or more restrictive than those under which pre-trial detainees or convicted prisoners are held, are pre101
sumptively punitive and unconstitutional. And, importantly, in the
Ninth Circuit, civilly confined persons need not prove deliberate in102
difference to demonstrate a violation of their constitutional rights.
However, although the Ninth Circuit has taken a stride in the right
direction, it is not a comprehensive enough remedy to fully afford relief to the many immigrants currently held in detention throughout
the United States.
Thus, detained nonimmigrants still face incredible burdens when
attempting to prove mistreatment while in custody. The standard articulated by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, that noncitizen detainees
allege “deliberate cruelty or severe physical abuse” to overcome a
103
qualified immunity defense, or even state a viable claim, which was
rejected as too stringent by the Supreme Court for convicted prisoners challenging the conditions of their confinement under the Eighth
Amendment, leaves alien detainees with very thin constitutional pro104
tections against inhumane treatment.
F. Potential Remedy Already in Existence?
At first glance, there appears to be a solution for detained noncitizens protesting the conditions of their confinement in Bivens v. Six
105
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, where the Supreme Court held that under certain circumstances, a plaintiff may
be entitled to recover money damages for injuries suffered as a result
106
of a government actor’s violation of the Constitution.
The claim
can essentially be analyzed as a “personal injury action for infringe107
ments of constitutional rights.” But upon further reflection, it will
become clear that the Bivens action is not a viable option for detained
noncitizens, most importantly because a Bivens claim must be
grounded in some sort of constitutional violation and, as demonstrated above, couching complaints regarding conditions of confinement
in constitutional terms is almost impossible. So while there exists a
potential constitutional remedy, it is just not adequate to fulfill the
101
102
103
104
105
106
107

Id. at 934.
Id.
Taylor, supra note 68, at 1151.
Id. at 1152.
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
Id. at 397.
Steve Helfand, Desensitization to Border Violence & the Bivens Remedy to Effectuate Systemic
Change, 12 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87, 108 (2001).
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needs of detained noncitizens who wish to protest the conditions of
their confinement.
In Bivens, six federal agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics unlawfully entered the plaintiff’s apartment and conducted an illegal
108
search of the premises.
Bivens asserted a claim under the Fourth
Amendment and the Court held that the Fourth Amendment created
a general right to file actions for damages in cases where federal offi109
cials violate constitutional or statutory rights.
Soon after, lower
courts began applying the Bivens remedy to other constitutional viola110
tions of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments.
In determining whether to recognize a remedy in Bivens, the
Court found that the plaintiff could recover monetary damages as
long as there existed “no special factors counseling hesitation in the
absence of affirmative action by Congress” and “no explicit congressional declaration[s] that persons injured by a federal officer[] . . . may not recover money damages from the agents, but must
instead be remitted to another remedy, equally effective in the view
111
of Congress.” When no alternative remedy exists, courts must then
“‘pay[] particular heed . . . to any special factors counseling hesita112
tion before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation,’” and in the
wide array of cases the Supreme Court has heard post-Bivens, it has
oftentimes “identified multiple ‘special factors’ to discourage courts
from implying a remedy, and, in most instances, has “found a Bivens
113
remedy unjustified.”
The Court once again denied the grant of a Bivens remedy in its
114
recent decision Hui v. Castenada, where it reversed the Ninth Circuit’s grant of a Bivens remedy to the family of Francisco Castenada,
108
109
110

111
112
113

114

Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
Id. at 392.
See Sripiya Narasimhan, Comment, Does “Keep Out!” Mean “Stay Out!”?: The Immigration
and Nationality Act’s Effect on Access to Federal Courts for Constitutional Actions, 12 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1443, 1450 (2010) (“The Court quickly signaled to the lower courts and potential plaintiffs that Bivens could be applied to other constitutional violations.”); see also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 244 (1979) (holding that the plaintiff in the case had a Bivens cause of action for a violation of her Fifth Amendment Due Process rights).
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396–97.
Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 111 (2010) (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S.
367, 378 (1983)).
Id. (citing Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 549–50 (2007)). In Wilkie, the Court made a
clear statement regarding its view of Bivens actions: “[W]e have . . . held that any freestanding damages remedy for a claimed constitutional violation has to represent a judgment about the best way to implement a constitutional guarantee; it is not an automatic
entitlement no matter what other means there may be to vindicate a protected interest . . . .” Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550.
130 S. Ct. 1845, 1855 (2010).
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who died of cancer in immigration detention when officers consis115
tently denied his requests to see a physician for a biopsy. The Court
was generally hesitant to imply a new remedy where one potentially
existed and then dismissed the case on a technicality, finding that 42
U.S.C § 233(a) granted “absolute immunity to PHS officers and employees for actions arising out of the performance of medical or related functions within the scope of their employment by barring all
116
actions against them for such conduct.” The Court did not directly
state that detained immigrants protesting conditions of confinement
cannot make use of the Bivens remedy, but by allowing health officials’ qualified immunity to protect them against suit, the remedy
does not seem to have the strength that is necessary to alleviate the
suffering of detained noncitizens.
Thus overall, recourse to Bivens is not a viable option for detained
117
noncitizens eager to challenge the conditions of their confinement.
In addition to having to base the claim in a violation of some constitutional right, the Supreme Court has also been extremely hesitant to
grant the remedy for fear of opening up the floodgates to enormous
amounts of litigation in the federal courts. While it may seem as
though noncitizens have a perfectly viable option in Bivens, that is not
the case, and some other method is needed for them to effectively
challenge the deplorable conditions of their confinement.
II. THE SOLUTION: THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
While noncitizens have some constitutional means of protesting
the duration and conditions of their detention, the remedy is imperfect and does not fully compensate detained immigrants forced to
live in squalid, inhumane conditions for long periods of time with little or no access to their families and legal counsel. Recourse to international human rights law and the Alien Tort Statute in these
conditions could prove to be a useful tool for these detained immigrants to receive recognition of their plight while also receiving compensation for their suffering. This Part will discuss a brief history of
the Alien Tort Statute, the human rights norms that could sustain a
claim, how that claim would be structured, and what obstacles might
need to be overcome.
115
116
117

Id.
Id. at 1851.
See Correctional Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (holding that implied damages actions recognized in Bivens should not be extended to allow recovery against a private
corporation operating a halfway house under contract with the Bureau of Prisons).
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A. The Alien Tort Statute: A Brief History
The Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), adopted by Congress in 1789 as
part of the first Judiciary Act and codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350, reads:
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of na118
tions or a treaty of the United States.” The statute remained in the
119
shadows for over two hundred years but was put in the spotlight in
120
1980 in Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, a landmark decision that interpreted
the statute to permit claims for modern human rights violations,
121
opening the door for such litigation in U.S. courts. In that case, a
Paraguayan national was tortured to death by Peña-Irala, the Inspec122
tor General of Police in Asunción. When Peña came to the United
States, the victim’s sister and father filed suit, invoking the ATS and
123
seeking damages.
The main issue litigated was whether a government’s torture of its own citizens constituted a “violation of the law of
124
The Second Circuit, in “[c]onstruing this rarely-invoked
nations.”
provision,” held that “deliberate torture perpetrated under color of
official authority violates universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights, regardless of the nationality of the par125
ties.” The court ruled that the ATS incorporated modern, evolving
international law norms and closed with a ringing endorsement of
the power of human rights norms:
In the twentieth century the international community has come to recognize the common danger posed by the flagrant disregard of basic human rights and particularly the right to be free of torture. . . . Indeed, for
purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become—like the pirate and
slaver trader before him—hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.
Our holding today, giving effect to a jurisdictional provision enacted by
our First Congress, is a small but important step in the fulfillment of the
126
ageless dream to free all people from brutal violence.

The court in Filartiga essentially held that customary international law
is federal common law, thus “instruct[ing] American courts that established norms of international human rights under customary in118
119

120
121
122
123
124
125
126

28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
William A. Fletcher, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, International
Human Rights in American Courts, Ola B. Smith Lecture at the University of Virginia
School of Law (Apr. 20, 2006), in 93 VA. L. REV. 653, 656 (2007).
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
Id.
Id. at 878.
Id. at 878–79.
Id. at 880 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 878.
Id. at 890.
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ternational law were binding on all American courts as federal com127
mon law.” It declared that these established norms of international
law may first “be ascertained by consulting the work of jurists . . . or
by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions
128
recognizing and enforcing that law,” and then confirmed as “a settled rule of international law” by “the general assent of civilized na129
tions” over many years.
Later cases, following in Filartiga’s footsteps, often adopted its
“passionate tone,” finding that the ATS covered a “small core of actionable human rights violations in addition to torture, including
summary execution, disappearance, war crimes, crimes against hu130
manity, slavery, and arbitrary detention.”
131
However, it was not until 2004 in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain that the
Supreme Court issued a definitive statement regarding the future of
ATS litigation and its reliance upon international human rights
norms. The case involved a civil lawsuit brought by Dr. AlvarezMachain, a Mexican national, who alleged that he was abducted by
Sosa at the behest of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency and forcibly
brought into the United States to stand trial; he brought suit against
Sosa, his abductor, along with the DEA and the United States gov132
ernment. The Court began its opinion by clarifying that the ATS is
a jurisdictional statute, enacted on the understanding that “the
common law would provide a cause of action for the modest number
133
of international law violations with a potential for personal liability.”
The Court then went on to clarify specifically what kinds of violations
of international law the statute covered, concluding that the “narrow
class of international norms” actionable under the ATS are those “of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined
with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century pa134
radigms we have recognized.” Thus, the Court, while affirming the
validity and usefulness of ATS litigation, made sure to limit its use to a
specified set of norms, those with definite content and widespread

127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

Fletcher, supra note 119, at 657.
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880 (quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 160–61 (1820))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694 (1900)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Beth Stephens, Comment, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: “The Door is Still Ajar” for Human
Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOKLYN L. REV. 533, 537 (2004).
542 U.S. 692 (2004).
Id. at 697.
Stephens, supra note 130, at 546 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724–25, 729.
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135

acceptance. But, the Court continued on to state that “the door is
136
still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping.”
In its discussion of those norms it considered to be widely accepted and specifically defined, the Court conducted a review of the
norm of arbitrary detention in response to Alvarez-Machain’s claims
that his arrest violated international law because it “exceed[ed] positive authorization to detain under the domestic law of some govern137
ment, regardless of the circumstances.”
The Court disagreed with
his broad definition of arbitrary detention and instead set forth what
appeared at first glance to be a damning analysis of what many in the
global community considered to be a well-established and wellsupported norm of international law: “It is enough to hold that a
single illegal detention of less than a day, followed by the transfer of
custody to lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment, violates no
norm of customary international law so well defined as to support the
138
creation of a federal remedy.”
However, to interpret the Court’s proclamation in this case as undermining the status of the prohibition against arbitrary arrest and
detention would be incongruous. The “physical security of persons
against arrest and imprisonment without due process of law has long
been considered a basic human right and a fundamental principle of
139
liberal democracy” and it is important to note that at no point did
the Court “declare that the arrest and detention of Alvarez-Machain
had been lawful, only that he had failed to prove that his treatment
140
violated an international norm.”
Thus, it was not necessarily the
case that the Court disapproved of the use of the norm against arbitrary detention as an anchor for ATS litigation but more that Alvarez141
Machain’s individual situation did not meet the standard.
As the door is still ajar, detained immigrants with both arbitrary
detention and conditions of confinement claims should not shy away
135
136
137
138
139

140
141

Stephens, supra note 130, at 551.
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729.
Id. at 736.
Id. at 738.
Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt Critique to Rest: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the
Future of International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2241, 2279
(2004).
Id. at 81 (2004).
See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 737 (“Any credible invocation of a principle against arbitrary detention that the civilized world accepts as binding customary international law requires a factual basis beyond relatively brief detention in excess of positive authority.”). From this it
is obvious that the Court does not believe that the prohibition against arbitrary detention
is not an established norm but just that in this particular situation, Alvarez-Machain’s
treatment did not meet the high standard.
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from asserting their claims in federal court, especially given the new
wave of ATS litigation concerning suits against corporate defendants.
As seen from the history of the use of the ATS, it is constantly changing and adapting to the needs of the people at the time, and given
the recent public spotlight on the conditions faced by detained immigrants in U.S. detention facilities, it is highly plausible that the
right ATS claim might just spur another revolution in the future of
142
ATS litigation.
B. The Logistics of Bringing a Claim under the ATS
“All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humani143
ty and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.”
This statement regarding how all detained human beings should be
treated asserts a standard that, sadly, the United States has failed to
realize, necessitating the use of ATS claims based on this and other
international human rights provisions on behalf of detained immigrants. In order to successfully argue a claim under the ATS protesting the conditions of confinement, a detained immigrant first needs
to base the claim in either customary international law or a treaty of
the United States. Prohibitions against cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment can be found in The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (“UDHR”), the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (“ICCPR”), and the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“the Tor144
ture Convention”).
While the United States is a party to both the
ICCPR and the Torture Convention, its accession is subject to various
reservations, understandings, and declarations.

142

143
144

See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 187 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that claims regarding non-consensual medical experimentation fall under the category of customary international law and can thus be used to base ATS jurisdiction).
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 10, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 176 [hereinafter ICCPR].
See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71
(Dec. 10, 1948) (stating the United Nation’s declaration of the equal and inalienable
rights and fundamental freedoms of each human being); ICCPR, supra note 143, art. 7, at
175 (presenting the United Nations’ recognition of the equal and inalienable rights of
the human family, founded in freedom, justice, and peace); Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 16, adopted Dec.
10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113, 116 (1988); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702(d)
(1987) (“A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones . . . torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment.”).
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The United States’ reservations to both the ICCPR and Torture
Convention state that it is bound by the cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment prohibitions only to the extent that those words mimic the
cruel and unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth,
145
Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments.
According to U.S. case
law, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment occurs in civil detention
only “when the alleged treatment constitutes ‘punishment,’” a determination that is ultimately made by the fact-finder, such as a judge
146
or jury. Given the state of U.S. immigration detention centers and
the fact that they have been described as akin to a prison environment, the problematic conditions can and often do constitute “punishment,” thus violating the United States’ obligations to refrain
from inflicting cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment on its detai147
nees.
But all of this is seemingly for naught given the United States’ declaration that both the ICCPR and Torture Convention are non-selfexecuting, meaning that they do not create a private right of action
148
absent express congressional legislation.
Thus, immigrant detainees cannot directly ground their ATS claims on United States treaty
obligations under the ICCPR and Torture Convention, but that does
not foreclose their option of using these treaty obligations as strong
evidence of a customary international norm against cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment. Significantly, the Court in Sosa recognized
this as well, noting that while non-self-executing treaties are not independently enforceable, they may be used as evidence of binding
149
customary international law.
“[O]ver time, it is possible for state practice to create a legally
binding rule in the form of customary international law . . . [which]

145

146

147
148

149

See 138 CONG. REC. S4781 (daily ed. April 2, 1992) (statement of Sen. Claiborne Pell regarding Senate consideration of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights); 136 CONG. REC. S17486 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (detailing the Senate’s consent
to the ratification of The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment).
Gwynne Skinner, Bringing International Law to Bear on the Detention of Refugees in the United
States, 16 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISPUTE RES. 270, 284 (2008) (citing Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)).
Id. at 285 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 (2008) (“[W]hile treaties ‘may comprise international commitments . . . they are not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be self-executing and is
ratified on these terms.’”).
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734–35 (2004).
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150

once established, is universally binding.”
Generally, customary international law emerges if there is “consistent state practice coupled
151
with opinio juris, a belief that such conduct is legally required.” The
Torture Convention defines cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
as “acts which inflict mental or physical suffering, anguish, humilia152
tion, fear, and debasement, which fall short of torture.” When one
looks to the sources of international law identified in Sosa, treaties,
judicial decisions, the practice of governments, and the opinions of
international scholars, “it is clear that there exists a universal, definable, and obligatory prohibition against cruel, inhuman, or degrading
153
treatment or punishment . . . actionable under the AT[S].”
The
prohibition against cruel, unusual, or degrading treatment or punishment can be found in numerous restatements, declarations, con154
ventions, and treaties.
It can also be found in regional human
rights instruments and cases from the International Court of Justice,
the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the African Commission on Human and
155
Peoples’ Rights. The United States has specific international policy
guidelines making it clear that abstention from cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment is an expectation of other states

150
151
152

153
154

155

Jeffrey Loan, Comment, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: Extraterritorial Abduction and the Rights of
Individuals Under International Law, 12 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 253, 267 (2005).
Id.
Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 452 F.3d 1284, 1285 n.1 (11th Cir. 2006)
(Barkett, J., dissenting) (citing Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman,
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, S. Exec. Rep. 101-30, 2d Sess. 13 (1990)).
Aldana, 452 F.3d at 1285 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
See e.g. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 144, art. 5 (“No one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”);
ICCPR, supra note 143, art. 7, at 175 (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.”); Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, supra note 144, arts. 1,
16 (“Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction
other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not
amount to torture as defined in article 1.”); American Convention on Human Rights, art.
5, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978) (“Every person has the right to
have his physical, mental, and moral integrity respected”); Declaration on the Protection
of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, art. 2, G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), U.N. Doc. A/10034 (Dec. 9,
1975) (“Any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is an offense to human dignity”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 144, § 702 (“A state violates international law
if . . . it practices, encourages or condones . . . cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment . . . .”).
Aldana, 452 F.3d at 1286 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
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156

and a settled global norm. Finally, numerous U.S. courts have recognized that the prohibition against cruel, inhuman, or degrading
157
treatment or punishment is a norm of customary international law.
Thus, there exists a global consensus regarding the status of the prohibition against cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment as a well158
established norm of international law.
This widespread evidence
from sources both inside and outside the United States should definitely meet the stricter standard set forth in Sosa that the norm be
159
“specific, universal, and obligatory.”
C. Potential Obstacles
Once a basis for
the next hurdle is
States government
shields it from civil

156

157

158

159
160

jurisdiction under the ATS has been established,
overcoming sovereign immunity. The United
generally enjoys sovereign immunity, which
160
suits, unless that immunity is waived.
While it

Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 1733(j) (2006), which prohibits agricultural commodities to countries that practice cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; 22 U.S.C.
§ 262d(a)(1) (2006), which states that U.S. policy is to channel international assistance
away from countries that practice cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment; 22 U.S.C. §
2151n (2006), which prohibits development assistance to countries that practice cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; and 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (2006), which
prohibits security assistance to countries that practice cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment).
See, e.g., Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1321–22 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment has been condemned by numerous
sources of international law and that conduct that meets its exacting standards may be
punishable under the ATCA); Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401, 437 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (“That it may present difficulties to pinpoint precisely where on the spectrum of
atrocities the shades of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment bleed into torture should
not detract from what really goes to the essence of any uncertainty: that . . . the infliction
of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment by agents of the state, as closely akin to or adjunct of torture, is universally condemned and renounced as offending internationally
recognized norms of civilized conduct.”); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ.
8386, 2002 WL 319887, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002) (finding that cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment is actionable under the ATCA).
Currently, the ICCPR has 167 nations that are parties to it, see International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/
doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-4.en.pdf (last visited Oct. 22,
2011), and the Torture Convention has 149 nations that are parties to it, see Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, UNITED
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume
%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-9.en.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2011).
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (citing In re Estate of Marcos, Human
Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)).
See Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (affirming that “the United States is
protected by the reservation of sovereign immunity in the ‘discretionary function’ exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act”).
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has been argued that suits under the ATS would not be successful for
achieving redress for aliens subjected to human rights abuses, this
might not be the case. The argument disfavoring reliance on the
ATS is that it “does not independently waive U.S. sovereign immunity.” Since the ATS is “jurisdictional and only creates a mechanism for
enforcing international law, it does not, in itself, create a private
161
cause of action.”
This argument is counterintuitive though, especially given that the primary purpose of the ATS is to “challenge state
162
action that has allegedly violated international human rights.”
Courts should not recognize a government’s assertion of sovereign
immunity in situations where grave human rights abuses have been
reported. Sovereign immunity “is limited in international law by obligations called erga omnes, which are owed to the international com163
munity rather than to any particular state.”
The Supreme Court echoed these sentiments, albeit indirectly, in
Rasul v. Bush, holding that “courts of the United States have tradi164
tionally been open to nonresident aliens” and that the ATS “expli165
citly confers the privilege of suing for an actionable tort.” Thus, the
Court remanded the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia to consider the merits of the petitioners’ ATS claims regarding their indefinite detention, implying that the District Court’s
initial refusal to hear these claims because they were barred by sove166
reign immunity was incorrect.
An additional development in the field of ATS litigation that will
ease the problem of overcoming federal sovereign immunity is the
rise of ATS litigation involving corporations and private government
contractors. This is significant because a large number of immigration detention centers are privately run. In Jama v. INS, various foreign nationals and refugees filed a complaint against Esmor Correctional Services (now Correctional Services Corporation), a private
detention center under contract with the U.S. Immigration and Na167
turalization Service (“INS”). Plaintiffs brought suit against the INS,
INS officials in their individual capacities, Esmor Correctional Servic161
162

163
164
165
166
167

Ellison, supra note 70, at 24.
Irena Nikolic, Comment, The Viability of Guantánamo Bay Detainees’ Alien Tort Statute Claims
Seeking Damages for Violations of the International Law Against Arbitrary Detention, 37 SETON
HALL L. REV. 893, 921 (2007).
Id. at 925 (citing Andrea Bianchi, Immunity Versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case, 10
EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 237, 271 (1999)).
542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004).
Id. at 485.
Id.
Jama v. INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 345 (D.N.J. 2004).
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es as a corporation, and Esmor guards in their individual capacities,
and the court held that while the INS was protected by foreign sove168
reign immunity, the INS officials, Esmor the corporation, and the
Esmor guards were not entitled to the protections of sovereign im169
munity.
The court explicitly held that “Esmor was clearly a contractor with
the United States” and could not “be held to be employees of the
government insulated from liability” because “Esmor and its employees in fact ran the Facility” without much effective control as170
serted by the INS. From here it becomes clear that detained noncitizens could potentially bring effective claims for relief against correccorrections officers and the correctional corporations they work for
as sovereign immunity does not seem to extend to them. In Jama,
Esmor tried to assert immunity by claiming a government contractor
defense, but the court struck that down as well, holding that “[i]n the
case of the INS . . . there is no federal statute expressly authorizing it
to contract with private companies to provide detention facilities for
171
aliens.”
The federal contractor defense originated in Boyle v. United Tech172
nologies Corp., where “the Court found that state tort law significantly conflicted with and had to give way to ‘uniquely federal interests’”
and that “‘[d]isplacement will occur only where . . . a ‘significant conflict’ exists between an identifiable ‘federal policy or interest and the
[operation] of state law’ or [where] the application of state law would
173
‘frustrate specific objectives’ of federal legislation.’”
In situations
where courts are balancing the government contractor defense
against the ATS, the protection of the “uniquely federal interest” in a
U.S. statute seemingly outweighs a government contractor’s sovereign
immunity defense, especially since most human rights abuses alleged
174
by ATS plaintiffs will presumably violate official U.S. policies as well.
Lastly, a rather novel argument that Guantanamo detainees have
started to use to circumvent the government’s sovereign immunity
defense that might prove useful to noncitizens detained in immigration facilities within the United States is reference to the Administra168
169
170
171
172
173
174

Id. at 349 (citing the court’s prior opinion in the same case, Jama v. INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d
353, 365 (D.N.J. 1998)).
Id. (citing the court’s prior opinion in the same case, Jama, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 365).
Id. at 357.
Id. at 356.
487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988).
Jenny S. Lam, Comment, Accountability for Private Military Contractors Under the Alien Tort
Statute, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1459, 1485 (2009) (citing Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504, 507).
Lam, supra note 173, at 1486–87.
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175

tive Procedure Act (“APA”).
Detainees have asserted, in response
to the claim that the ATS does not itself waive sovereign immunity,
that the APA does by providing for judicial review for “any person suffering legal wrong because of agency action . . . [and] seeking relief
176
other than money damages.” Petitioners in In re Guantanamo Detai177
nee Cases did in fact argue that violations of the ATS constituted
such “legal wrongs” and sought injunctive relief and acknowledgement that “the conditions of their confinement violate[d] customary
international law and international treaties prohibiting pro178
longed . . . detention.”
The APA might prove to be a viable solution at getting around the
sovereign immunity defense because it provides a presumption that
agency action is reviewable absent express statutory preclusion or explicit and exclusive delegation to the discretion of the agency by
179
law. It also mandates review of an agency where there is “no other
180
adequate remedy in a court.” Consequently, if noncitizens are able
to establish that ICE is an agency within the meaning of the APA, they
can then argue that ICE’s actions with respect to their confinement is
subject to judicial review because they have no other remedy in court.
This method would potentially allow noncitizens detained in immigration detention centers to present their claims based on violations
of international human rights law in United States federal courts.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Sosa spurred a veritable revolution in the use of ATS litigation to address new and novel
human rights abuses. With both the ATS and a little imaginative lawyering, detained immigrants protesting conditions of confinement
based on the customary international norm against cruel, inhuman,
and degrading treatment have a high probability of being heard and
compensated. At this point, conditions in immigration detention
centers are deplorable and perhaps reminding the courts that nonci-

175
176
177
178
179
180

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–06 (2006).
See id. at § 702; see also Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 207–08 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(acknowledging that the APA may waive sovereign immunity under the ATS).
355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005).
Petitioners’ Memorandum in Opposition to Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss at 45, In re
Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (No. 04-CV-1166).
See Von Clemm v. Banuelos, 365 F. Supp. 477, 481 (D. Mass. 1973), aff’d 498 F.2d 163 (1st
Cir. 1974).
5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006) (“Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action
for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.”).
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tizen detainees are human beings deserving of respect, dignity, and
fair treatment will help further their cause and achieve immigration
detention reform. This is especially true today as there exists individuals and groups who would like to further inhibit the natural and in181
violable rights due to all human beings, legal or not.
In September 2008, ICE formulated forty-one new performancebased detention standards, which were to take full effect in all deten182
tion facilities in January 2010. The standards are broken down into
183
categories such as “safety,” “security,” “order,” and “care.” They include provisions that are aimed to address some of the biggest prob184
lems in detention centers, like access to medical care.
However,
while implementing these measures is a step in the right direction,
the standards are still only guidelines and are not legally enforceable.
Additionally, while there exists pending legislation to rectify the sad
185
state of immigration detention centers, until this legislation is ac-

181

182

183

184

185

See Keep Our Communities Safe Act of 2011, H.R. 1932, 112th Cong. (2011), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/news/pdfs/Keep%20Our%20Communities%20Safe.pdf; see
also Oppose H.R. 1932: Prolonged and Indefinite Detention, ACLU, http://www. aclu.org/files
/assets/hr_1932_issue_brief_final.pdf (last updated Aug. 2, 2011); Chris Rickerd, Expanded Immigration Detention: Locking Up Those Yearning to Breathe Free, HUFFINGTON POST,
Nov. 1, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/end-ice-abuse/expanded-immigrationdete_b_1067254.html, for a description of the proposed legislation, introduced by Rep.
Lamar Smith (R-Texas). The bill would authorize the prolonged, indefinite detention of
immigrants by allowing DHS to detain individuals without a bond hearing before an immigration judge while they wait for a final resolution in their cases (which can often take
years) and allowing the indefinite detention, potentially for life, of those who have been
ordered removed but cannot be deported. Id. This proposed bill would directly impinge
upon the due process rights of immigrants and directly contravene what the Supreme
Court held in Zadvydas v. Davis.
Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ICE Announces New Performance-Based National Detention Standards for All ICE Detention Facilities (Sep. 12,
2008), http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/0809/080912washington.htm.
2008 Operations Manual ICE Performance Based National Detention Standards (PBNDS), U.S.
IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/detention-standards/2008/
(last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
See id.; see also ICE/DRO Detention Standard: Medical Care, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/detention-standards/pdf/medical_care.
pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2011) (“This Detention Standard ensures that detainees have
access to emergent, urgent, or non-emergent medical, dental, and mental health care
that are within the scope of services provided by the DIHS, so that their health care needs
are met in a timely and efficient manner.”).
Maryam N. Mohamed, Legislation to Regulate Immigration Detention System Introduced: Bills
Will Protect U.S. Citizens from Unlawful Detention and Ensure Due Process Rights to Detainees, 24
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 107, 107 (2009) (“The Strong STANDARDS (Strong Safe Treatment,
Avoiding Needless Deaths, and Abuse Reduction in the Detention System) Act sets minimum detention standards and requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to ensure
that laws concerning the treatment of detainees are properly enforced.” (citing Strong
STANDARDS Act, S. 1550, 111th Cong. (2009))).
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tually passed, detained noncitizens must have some other means of
vindicating their rights.
What noncitizens need now is an effective and legally enforceable
means to assert their internationally recognized right to be free from
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. This Comment has demonstrated how litigation under the ATS has the ability to achieve for
noncitizens detained in deplorable conditions a recognition of their
rights and remuneration for any harms suffered. The state of immigration detention in this country needs to change, and using the ATS
to hold the United States government accountable for its actions is a
first step in the right direction.

